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Abstract 
In the summer of 2014, about one million Iraqis were forced into internal 
displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) following successful 
incursions of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant into bordering areas. To 
mobilize assistance and respond to the immense humanitarian needs, the UN 
assigned the situation its highest level of emergency, L3. This thesis investigates 
the emergency response coordination structure that had evolved four months later 
between the Kurdistan Regional Government, the UN, and non-governmental 
organizations, and analyses factors that constrain efficient coordination. 
Through a field study made in the KR-I, and based on approximately 50 key 
informant interviews, this thesis found that the emerged structure was so complex, 
non-uniform, and unsystematized that few understood or trusted it. Coordination 
at all levels of the response was insufficient, leading to both gaps and over-
lappings: inconsistencies and redundancies. Characteristics of organized anarchies 
(i.e. fluid participation, unclear technology, and problematic preferences) help 
explain the low level of coordination. Furthermore, weak leadership as well as 
dispersed and inadequate resources—financial and human—intensified 
competition among the actors involved, which further impaired incentives for 
coordination (e.g., lack of information sharing). This, in combination with 
uncertainties regarding future funding and security, poses challenges to meet the 
needs of the internally displaced Iraqis in a systematic, coordinated, and sustain-
able manner. 
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1 Introduction 
In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) made rapid 
and significant territorial gains in northern Iraq, forcing nearly 1.2 million1 Iraqis 
to flee. (IOM 2014-08-23) Such a massive wave of internal displacement, together 
with existing vulnerabilities in the country,2 created a complex, chaotic and over-
whelming humanitarian crisis with hundreds of thousands of people in desperate 
need of protection, shelter, food, water, and medical care. (cf. HNO 2014) 
In August, the United Nations (UN) designated the situation a Level 3 emer-
gency (L3), its highest level, to “facilitate mobilization of additional resources in 
goods, funds and assets to ensure a more effective response to the humanitarian 
needs of populations affected by forced displacements” (UN 2014-08-14). Six 
weeks earlier, on 30 June 2014, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had contributed 
USD 500 million to the UN—the largest single contribution of its kind for UN 
humanitarian operations—for scaling up operations and providing humanitarian 
assistance to the internally displaced Iraqis. (SHF 2014) 
By August, around 1 million newly internally displaced persons (IDPs) had 
sought refuge in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I),3 already 
host to more than 200,000 Syrian refugees. As IDPs and funds were moving 
towards the KR-I, so were international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 
and the scaled-up UN Iraq operation, which was being evacuated from Baghdad to 
Erbil, the KR-I capital, owing to a worsened security situation. 
 
Last spring, in my position at KPMG,4 I audited an INGO with on-the-ground 
projects in Erbil. At that time, before the current turmoil, its projects were mainly 
funded by the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and linked to the protection and 
assistance of Syrian refugees. It was already then obvious that the management 
and coordination of efforts to receive, protect, and provide assistance to these 
refugees posed a challenge, both within and between various institutional entities.  
Following developments that summer, I could not help but wonder how efforts 
to respond to this overwhelming influx of Iraqi IDPs would be organized and 
coordinated given the myriad of actors involved. The best way to find out was to 
visit the source: the KR-I. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Quantifying the number of IDPs has constituted a challenge for humanitarian actors as well as government 
authorities, since many continue displacing themselves, are not required to register with local authorities (cf. 
refugees), and live in informal settings. The IOM Displacement Tracking Index (DTM) is considered the most 
reliable source of information on internal displacement, and is updated bi-weekly. (http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page)  
2 Vulnerabilities such as complex ethno-sectarian divisions as well as already scattered internally displaced 
Iraqis around the country, a legacy of the 2003–2011 war. (cf. HNO 2014) 
3 See Appendix A for an illustration of the waves of internal displacement during 6 June–18 August 2014. 
4 KPMG is a global network of professional firms providing audit, tax and advisory services.  
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1.1 Actors and Responsibility in the IDP Crisis 
According to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, national gov-
ernments and authorities have “the primary duty and responsibility to provide 
protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their 
jurisdiction” (UN 2004). Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
governs the KR-I, the region is a federal entity of Iraq—not yet an independent 
state—and largely dependent on budget allocations from the Government of Iraq 
(GoI) in Baghdad. This is a source of deep dispute between the two 
administrations, and for several months in 2014, for example, the GoI withheld 
payment of the KRG budget5 after the regional government brokered an oil export 
deal with Turkey. (HNO 2014:20) 
Ultimate responsibility for protecting and assisting Iraqi citizens—including 
those in the KR-I—lies on the GoI. However, to efficiently respond to IDP needs 
in the KR-I, the GoI must coordinate with KRG. The focus of this study was to 
find out what was really happening on the ground: who was coordinating and 
leading the response in the KR-I? Was it the GoI, as it should be; or the KRG; 
or—perhaps—some other humanitarian actor or group of actors? 
From the perspective of the humanitarian community, no one agency is assign-
ed to protect IDPs. Although fleeing for similar reasons, since they have crossed 
no international borders, displaced Iraqis in the KR-I have no refugee status,6 nor 
are they entitled to protection by the UNHCR. Due to the influx of Syrian 
refugees, however, this agency already had a vast presence in the KR-I before the 
summer, in contrast to other humanitarian agencies—mainly UN entities—
responsible for emergency responses under the umbrella of the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The IASC 
is the primary inter-agency coordination mechanism for humanitarian assistance 
in emergencies such as this one, tasked with bringing together governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors to ensure an efficient and 
coordinated response.7 
1.2 Statement of Purpose 
Crisis management literature reports that emergency responses are often complex 
and large scale, involving both public and private actors from dissimilar response 
organizations, which normally cooperate poorly, if at all. (cf. Boin et al 2012; 
Chen et al 2008) It is widely acknowledged that efficient coordination of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 The GoI allocates 17% of the federal budget to the KRG. (Guiu 2014) 
6 See the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 
7 See section 2.1 and chapter 5 (specifically section 5.2) for how humanitarian emergency responses should be 
coordinated (in theory) and have actually been coordinated (in practice) in the KR-I. 
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emergency responses is vital, but highly demanding. Despite this, academic 
research in the political science field remains remarkably scarce8 and more, in-
depth research could greatly benefit future situations.  
The topic of coordination in the unfolding IDP emergency in the KR-I—L3 
status has been extended to May 2015, and will most likely be extended further—
has yet to be addressed in full in the literature. To my knowledge only two 
reviews9—done by IASC members—have discussed coordination. But these only 
touched on the humanitarian coordination mechanism and thus excluded the main 
actor—government; they did not survey and clarify the coordination structure of 
the entire response.10 
 
Thus, the research question explored in this thesis was: 
 
Has overall coordination of the IDP response actions between the 
government, UN agencies and NGOs in the KR-I been efficient? Why, 
or why not? 
 
To answer this, the study sought to clarify: 
 
The coordination structure emerging from responses of the three actor 
categories to the massive influx of IDPs into the KR-I  
 
Factors contributing to inadequate coordination between these actors 
within the currently emerging structure  
1.3 Context and Scope 
The humanitarian crisis in Iraq is a complex and rapidly changing emergency that 
cannot be explained simply as arising from ISIL gaining control over large 
territories and forcing large masses of Iraqis into displacement. The situation in 
Iraq is not an isolated event but has links to, for example, the Syrian crisis and 
other regional developments, to realpolitik, and to failures of Iraqi nation-building 
and internal ethno-sectarian politics that have caused conflicts for decades.  
In all, 5.2 million people in Iraq are currently (March 2015) in need of 
humanitarian assistance; and this includes IDPs as well as host communities, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 Information is rather to be found within the management (e.g., Boin et al 2012) or engineering/systems field 
(e.g., Chen et al 2008; Comfort et al 2004) or from the practitioning field itself (e.g., UN articles, donor 
assessments etc.). 
9 Iraq Humanitarian Coordination Review, OCHA, January 2015 (HCR 2015); and  Iraq – Duhok Governorate 
IDP Camps and Unfinished Buildings. WASH Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment Team. January 2015 (IRAT 
2015). 
10 Stakeholders who inputted to the Iraq Humanitarian Coordination Review explicitly requested a map of the 
entire structure. (cf. HCR 2015) 
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refugees, and other vulnerable groups. (SRP 2014:4; OCHA 2015-02-28) Of the 
over 2 million IDPs in the country today, around half reside in the KR-I; the rest 
are in the southern and central parts of the country, many of them in areas no 
longer controlled by the GoI but by armed groups such as ISIL, and thus difficult 
for either governmental or humanitarian actors to access. 
The scope of this thesis, however, is limited to coordination of the IDP re-
sponse in the KR-I, due to security reasons and access to information, and does 
not specifically look at how the IDP and refugee responses are connected.11  
To study coordination of this unfolding IDP response is in itself an ambitious 
task; it is difficult to fully grasp, and impossible to reproduce in a thesis of this 
size. Thus, this thesis claims to be neither all-encompassing, nor up to date by the 
time of printing, due to the rapidly changing nature of the situation. So, instead of 
a detailed, precise description of the situation, this study investigates the 
complexity and mechanisms of emergency response coordination, and the issues 
characterizing this specific case. The aim was to paint an overall perspective—the 
big picture—of response coordination between the government12 (KRG), UN 
agencies (under the IASC umbrella), and NGOs as implementing partners. Most 
stakeholders lack this overview, and without such, the risk is that valuable 
resources will be squandered. This study thus largely excludes actors such as the 
GoI, the host community, donors, and the private sector.  
This thesis is based mainly on empirical material collected during a field study 
in the KR-I from November 2014 until January 2015. It covers two of the three 
KR-I governorates: Duhok, since it has received the largest share of IDPs; and 
Erbil, the regional capital and Iraq’s humanitarian hub. Materials and Methods 
describes the field study in more detail. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 Since the IDP and refugee responses are interlinked, and a harmonization of these is ongoing, this will 
however be discussed briefly. 
12 If not stated otherwise, the term government in this thesis refers to the KRG, since—although a regional 
government—it is the government that has the vaster presence in KR-I and so has been the main government 
involved in this study. 
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2 Defining Emergency Coordination 
Coordination is stressed to be imperative in governance arrangements in general 
(cf. Bevir 2009; Peters 2002) and in emergency responses in particular.  
 
Effective coordination is the hidden force multiplier in emergency response. 
With coordination, one plus one plus one does not equal three; it equals five, 
or ten. It reduces duplication and competition, and allows different agencies 
and organizations to complement each other and give added value. (Amos in 
OCHA 2012a)  
 
This widely used term—coordination—is seldom clearly defined. Evaluating its 
efficiency then becomes difficult. Academically, coordination in its general sense 
occurs ”whenever two or more policy actors pursue a common outcome and work 
together to produce it”. (Bevir 2009:56f) In itself, coordination is not a given in a 
governance structure (such as the IDP response one), but rather, as Bevir puts it, 
“both a driving force of governance and one of its goals”. (ibid.) 
To study and evaluate IDP response coordination in the KR-I, a clearer and 
more operationalized term is needed. Sources in the operational emergency field 
use more practically oriented definitions. Both the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
(MSB) stress that coordination in emergencies should encompass (1) assessing the 
situation and needs (identifying gaps, etc.), (2) agreeing on common priorities, (3) 
developing common strategies (e.g., to mobilize funds and other resources), (4) 
defining roles and responsibilities, and (5) monitoring and evaluating progress. 
(OCHA 2015a) For response coordination to be efficient, it should entail the 
lowest possible cost and the fastest possible transition from emergency, to relief, 
and finally development. (Tofvesson 2015) 
2.1 The Cluster Approach – Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Coordination in Emergencies 
International humanitarian coordination has evolved significantly in recent dec-
ades and today involves numerous (UN and non-UN) actors along with an 
established coordination system that is activated in case of emergencies. The goal 
  6 
of this system is to improve the effectiveness of responses by “ensuring greater 
predictability, accountability and partnership”. (OCHA 2015a) 
On the global level, the ERC13 is responsible for overseeing all emergencies 
requiring UN humanitarian assistance and also heads the IASC. In a country 
affected by conflict or disaster, the ERC may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator 
(HC) to ensure that response efforts are appropriate and well organized in relation 
to the specific country. This is done together with, or as head of, the Humanitarian 
Country Team (HCT)14, which comprises UN agencies, IOM and INGOs. The 
work of the HCT includes identifying which clusters need to be activated, as well 
as which agency is most suited to leading that cluster. (OCHA 2015b; OCHA 
2012a) 
Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations—everyone is welcome15—
involved in response activities in each of the main sectors of humanitarian 
action.16 Heads of lead agencies of clusters are members of the HCT and are 
responsible for overseeing the establishment of coordination mechanisms and the 
dissemination of cluster specific information to the HC and the HCT. They also 
serve as the main contact for government and should also act as “provider of last 
resort” in their respective cluster.17 (OCHA 2012b) 
A cluster coordinator, usually employed by the lead agency but working on 
behalf of and solely for the interests of the cluster, is responsible for operational 
coordination and leadership of the clusters (cf. the coordination characteristics 
above). Clusters can exist on various levels in a country—national, sub-national 
and local—which also require coordination within these. How clusters are set up 
in a country is context specific; clusters should reflect government levels and have 
government counterparts. (IASC3) 
At national level, OCHA operates as the secretariat and supports the HC and 
the HCT, for example, advising on appropriate coordination structures. OCHA is 
also responsible for inter-cluster coordination, such as establishing forums for 
discussing strategic and operational decisions on a joint inter-sectorial basis and 
drafting endorsements to avoid siloization. (OCHA 2012b:2)  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13 The ERC is also the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. UN resolution 46/182 (adopted in 
1991) created the ERC to coordinate humanitarian assistance in response to emergencies in need of it. (OCHA 
2012a:35) 
14 The HC is the head of the HCT. 
15 Wide, representative participation in clusters is desirable, but too many short-term actors can negatively 
impact cluster efficiency. The IASC has thus specified minimum requirements for cluster participation. (See 
Appendix C for these.) (OCHA 2015b)  
16 See Appendix B for an overview of global clusters and cluster lead agencies. 
17 The ”provider of last resort” represents a commitment of cluster lead agencies to do their utmost to ensure an 
adequate and appropriate response. It is contingent upon local context, namely access, security, and availability 
of funding. Where there are critical gaps in humanitarian response, it is the responsibility of cluster leads to call 
on all relevant humanitarian partners to address these. If this fails, then the cluster lead as ”provider of last 
resort” may need to commit itself to filling the gap. Wherever there are significant gaps in the humanitarian 
response, cluster leads are responsible for continuing advocacy efforts and explaining constraints to stakeholders. 
(OCHA 2012b) 
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Global IASC-produced tools, methodologies, best practices, standards and re-
quirements are available to clusters and OCHA in emergencies, to ensure a struc-
tured, effective, and accountable response. Examples of these include:  
 
§ Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessments (MIRA)18  
§ Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO)19  
§ Strategic Response Plans (SRPs)20  
 
Roles and responsibilities are divided in the clusters through the 4W system (who 
is doing what, where and when?). (OCHA 2015c) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
18 A MIRA is a joint needs assessment that should be conducted during the initial two weeks of a crisis. 
19 An HNO is a more comprehensive assessment than the MIRA, addressing the impact of the crisis and needs of 
the affected population. 
20 An SRP should draft strategic objectives based on the HNO to address needs, with accompanying activities 
and projects. 
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3 IDP Response Coordination in Theory 
Theoretically, since neither thematic nor geographic aspects of this study’s topic 
have been well investigated in the literature, an eclectic approach will be used. 
The theoretical toolbox must take account of factors such as policymaking under 
uncertainty, involvement of numerous actors and interests—governmental as well 
as non-governmental at different levels—operating in complex fast-changing 
contexts, with evolving (formal and informal) relational response structures. 
This thesis uses explanatory variables from two complementary theoretical 
lenses to address these issues: network theory and multiple streams framework 
(MS). 
3.1 Networks: Actors and Interdependence 
To study coordination between actors, network theory provides insights on how 
formal as well as informal institutional arrangements, and type of interaction 
within these, affect the policy process and policy change. As Bevir (2011:17) 
writes, as the world is becoming more complex, responses to it also may need to 
be devised, assumingly with ”modes of governance that are increasingly hybrid 
and multijurisdictional, linking plural stakeholders in complex networks”.  
Network theory assumes pluralism; thus one (state) actor cannot control policy 
processes alone. Rather, it is the interactions between state and non-state actors 
that characterize policy subsystems—actors dealing with specific policy issues. 
And these interactions are increasingly complex and diverse. (Adam—Kriesi 
2007:129; Bevir 2011:29) It has been argued that to be effective, or at all 
influential, networks must be connected to or include the government function 
that is responsible for policymaking for that policy subsystem. (Pierre—Peters 
2005:78) Börzel and Panke (2007:157) take this further and argue that when 
traditional hierarchical governing is ineffective, governments can use networks to 
mobilize resources dispersed among public and private actors, from international 
to local levels. 
Although network theory acknowledges hierarchical, or vertical, coordination 
structures (with clear chains of command), it tends to explain horizontal and de-
centralized governance relations. Kenis and Schneider (1991:301) observed an 
increasing ‟scope, sectoralization, decentralization, fragmentation and informati-
zation (i.e., increasing importance of information)” of policymaking. This, along 
with blurring boundaries of public and private spheres, hint that actors who are 
formally responsible for political decisions might not be the only—or even most 
influential—ones. (Adam—Kriesi 2007:131f) Also, control, steering, and 
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coordination become increasingly elusive for policymakers in such complex 
networks. (Bevir 2011:12) 
Policy networks are seen as constituting fairly stable patterns of interaction 
between a diversity of interdependent actors, which take shape around policy 
problems (Kickert et al 1997:6). Interdependence is the explanatory motor in this 
theory; actors are mutually dependent on each other and cooperate because they 
need each others’ resources—whether financial, constitutional-legal, organiza-
tional, political, or informational—to realize their respective goals. Networks 
often emerge when power and resources are dispersed among actors in a field. 
(Enroth 2011:28) However, Bevir (2011:59) writes that for actors in a network to 
really coordinate, it seems like trust in the network by participants is also needed, 
‟in the context of interdependence”. 
The ability of a network to produce policy change depends on a number of 
factors: (1) size and complexity, (2) mode, (3) capacity, and, (4) access. Less 
integrated—thus more fragmented—networks are more complex and larger in 
size, have a competitive mode (since power and resources are fragmented), lower 
administrative capacity, and open access; while more integrated networks are 
smaller and simpler, have a consensual mode, higher capacity, and more restricted 
access. Access can also relate to the degree to which networks are self-referential; 
the more homogenous the actors in the network are, the less they will take note of 
steering signals from outside. (cf. Kickert et al 1997:56)  
As addressed by both Adam and Kriesi (2007:145) and Zahariadis (2007:72f), 
a proponent of the MS (presented below), more integrated networks have higher 
potentials to reach agreement and functioning coordination. However, to produce 
policy change—in a larger policy subsystem—all relevant actors must naturally 
be involved, requiring a more open-access network. (ibid.) 
3.2 Policymaking under Ambiguity: Elements of 
Organized Anarchies That Constrain Efficient 
Coordination 
Network theory is attentive to complexity and context when studying policy-
making, but has interdependence as explanatory factor for coordination among 
actors. In this study, additional theoretical tools that address coordination in 
conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty are needed. Appropriately enough, 
Kingdon’s (2014) MS deals with this.  
With this theoretical lens, governance arenas as well as organizational actors 
can be characterized as organized anarchies, with these defining elements: 
 
Problematic Preferences 
Instead of following rational and clearly defined goals, actors often act in absence 
of such due to, for example, time constraints. (Zahariadis 2007:67) Individual 
actors might have consistent preferences (cf. interdependence in network theory), 
but those in the decision-making structure, as a whole, do not. (Peters 2002:9)  
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Unclear Technology 
Members of an organized anarchy do not know or understand the processes in the 
organization. They might be aware of their own role and responsibility within the 
structure, but they do not see how their contributions fit into the larger organiza-
tional picture nor, thus, why they are doing what they are doing. Kingdon 
(2014:84) means that organized anarchies often operate by trial and error and 
pragmatic intervention in emergencies. The structuring of the system largely 
occurs by adaptation rather than proactive and strategic planning from the center. 
Thus, as Peters (2002:11) writes: ‟just as the goals of governing may emerge 
rather than being imposed […] so too are the means of achieving those ends also 
likely to be emerged rather than planned.” 
 
Fluid Participation 
Staff turnover in such organizations is high, and participants tend to drift from one 
decision to the next. The time and effort that actors are prepared to devote to var-
ious subjects vary. Membership in such an anarchy or network might be 
problematic, if organizational boundaries are fluid and the decision-making 
process tends to be poorly defined. Peters (2002:11) describes participation as a 
game-like process (similar to in network theory) where participants might not 
totally ignore possibilities of involvement, but level of involvement depends on 
what they get out of it. Therefore, who shows up for a meeting and their degree of 
activity during the meeting, for example, has a big impact on outcome. (Kingdon 
2014:84) 
  
The main assumption in MS is that, rather than being solely rational or predic-
table, decision making is often a result of an accidental confluence of opportu-
nities, individuals and ideas—no one actor controls the process (Zahariadis 
2007:66). This coincides with the pluralistic network theory arguments of blurring 
governance boundaries, in a world that is less clearly governed through authority 
and hierarchy. MS views the outcome of a policy process as a confluence of 
streams of possibilities rather than a search for the best solution to the problem, 
which may explain, for example, ad hoc and reactive decision making as well as 
non-decision making. Indeed, Peters (2002:14) acknowledges that in the absence 
of coherent preferences and a top-down mechanism for driving action ahead, 
avoidance is a common outcome of decision making in or by organized anarchies.  
Despite these characteristics, such governance arenas do function, but hardly 
as efficiently—concerning either costs or time—as would be desirable. (Kingdon 
2014:85) 
However, at critical times, policy windows open up for policy change in these 
governance arenas: a problem is recognized, a solution is available, politics and 
other possible constraints are not severe. (ibid.:165) The literature mentions crises 
as possible policy windows. The question is whether this has occurred in the KR-
I, with the IDP crisis creating a policy window for efficient response coordination 
and decision-making among actors. 
MS contends that individual actors—so-called policy entrepreneurs—play a 
key role in producing action during these policy windows; making sense of 
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ambiguous or uncertain information, attaching solutions to problems, overcoming 
constraints by redrafting proposals and taking advantage of events. Even crisis 
management literature points to the need for individuals to keynote and define the 
nature of the crisis before effective organizational action can proceed. (Peters 
2002:14) 
3.3 Theoretical Compatibility and Implications 
Both theoretical approaches highlight informal, context dependent, complex and 
constantly evolving decision making arenas, where network theory explains inter-
action systems that are rather stable and structured—due to interdependency—and 
MS stresses the randomness, fluidity, timing and role of individuals in policy-
making. However, Kingdon (2014:206) does acknowledge a degree of pattern, 
such as institutional arrangements, rules of procedure and budget constraints—and 
he does stress the importance of policy communities and networks as arenas for 
finding solutions to problems. Thus, I consider these approaches compatible and 
complementary.  
What Boin et al (2012:60) stress, however, is the importance of clear 
leadership in the event of an emergency, which fosters coordination by defining 
direction, enforcing decisions, and dividing roles and responsibilities. The issue of 
leadership or authority is not particularly well captured in the chosen theoretical 
approaches; rather, they explain horizontal governance where management and 
control is elusive since power is not in the hands of one single actor. Also, rational 
and linear policy making—required to live up to the requirements of efficient 
response coordination, where problems are identified and strategies to address 
these are jointly developed and executed—is not possible, according to these 
theories, except during a policy window. 
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4 Materials and Methods 
4.1 Qualitative Case Study 
In its analysis of IDP response coordination in the KR-I, this qualitative study of a 
specific case provides rich, in-depth descriptions of complex phenomena that 
consider context, structures, and agency. (cf. Lundquist 1993:71) In its approach 
to the empirical material, the analysis also allows for relative openness. (Mahoney 
2007:132) This is in line with the exploratory approach used in this study, where 
the focus is empirical reality.21  
By exploring the possible theoretical explanations of the specific case, this 
study tests the explanatory power of MS and network theory concepts in a new 
context. (Eckstein 1992:139) The case presented here is mixed, with both inter-
national and national (governmental) actors operating in an eruptive, non-western, 
and complex political environment. Indeed, both theories have mainly been used 
to explain policymaking in democratic and western contexts. (cf. Bevir 2007) 
However, the theories have not been chosen for the sake of testing but for their 
explanatory variables that help explain the case at hand.  
4.2 Field Research and Data Collection in the KR-I 
Since the study attempted to capture a critical and ongoing phenomenon, materials 
must be collected on the ground. In emergencies, decision making processes and 
policies tend not to be formalized and documented as would ideally be the case, so 
qualitative interviews seemed to be the obvious source of both formal and 
informal information on how actors responded to the emergency. Between 
November 2014 and January 2015, I conducted approximately 50 interviews in 
the KR-I.22  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
21 Furthermore, both chosen theories are empirically oriented and have mainly been applied in qualitative case 
studies. (cf. Zahariadis 2007; Adam—Kriesi 2007) 
22 See Appendix E for the complete list of interviewees. Most interviews were conducted in English or Swedish, 
and one in Arabic. A few interviews used Kurdish-English interpretation; although this added another link in the 
chain between the interviewer and the interviewee, and the risk is loss of information, I have no reason to believe 
that this had a substantial impact on the substance of the material. 
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4.2.1 Stakeholder Mapping 
A mapping of the network of actors and how they relate to each other was 
necessary to form an overview of the coordination structure of the entire response. 
So, before traveling to Iraq for the field study, I identified the main key actors,23 
and chose to focus on the UN, NGOs, and the KRG as they are organized entities, 
easy to identify, operate in the KR-I, and should be involved in IDP response 
coordination.  
Initially, the aim was to hold workshops with the various actor categories for 
social network mapping24 in order to interactively discuss and map the network of 
actors, discuss interlinkings, power constellations, and so on.  Due to the ongoing 
emergency, this task failed; however, individual qualitative interviews enabled 
mapping of the IDP response coordination structure.25 The interviews yielded 
valuable information about the mechanisms—both formal and observable as well 
as informal and unobservable—which underpinned the interaction and coordi-
nation behavior of the actors. (cf. Cederman 2005:867f) 
4.2.2 Interviews 
Before traveling to Iraq, I met with the KRG representative to Sweden to discuss 
the proposed study and the IDP situation in the KR-I. Mr. Rahem was very 
positive to the plans and offered unreserved support, which opened the doors to 
the KRG. In the KR-I, administrators at the Department of Foreign Relations 
helped me arrange meetings with persons, departments and ministries important 
for this thesis: for example, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations; the 
Governor of Erbil; and the Vice-Governor of Duhok, responsible for the IDP 
response there. 
In the humanitarian community, many interviewees were selected strategically 
(e.g., cluster coordinators, large NGOs and OCHA representatives) while others 
were selected more randomly through personal contacts and recommendations 
(so-called snow ball selection [Esaiasson 2007:291]) or meetings in the field. 
Most interviewees were involved in response coordination mechanisms and had 
been chosen for their centrality; however, some sources were considered interest-
ing because they were not involved in these mechanisms and could provide a 
valuable outside perspective. National NGO representatives, researchers, and UN 
representatives not involved in response activities are examples of such sources. 
In all, it was surprisingly easy to access people; although this study took place 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 The main actors identified were the GoI, the KRG, UN bodies (under IASC), international organizations and 
donors, NGOs as implementing partners, and ‟others” (e.g., private sector, host community, and churches). 
24  The social network mapping exercise was designed to facilitate discussion among the stakeholders on topics 
such as: (1) Who are the involved actors? (2) How are they linked? (financial flow, advisory relations, conflict-
ing interests, political pressure, etc.), (3) What are their goals/preferences/characteristics?, and (4) How in-
fluential are these actors? (cf. Shiffer—Waale 2008)  
25 See Appendix D for a map of the IDP response coordination structure in the KR-I. 
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during an L3 emergency, key stakeholders in all three actor categories took time 
to meet me.  
Key informant interviews were conducted to collect prime information about 
processes, policies, roles and responsibilities, coordination, and implemented 
activities. The interviews also gave space for personal reflection. (cf. Esaiasson et 
al 2007:296f) Written material not accessible to the public was also made 
avaliable. The interviews were exploratory since they followed no strict pattern or 
structure. (Kvale 1997:117) The peculiarity of each interviewee and the intention 
to allow each informant to steer the direction of the interview made this necessary. 
The interviews were not completely unstructured, however; some common 
questions were asked in all interviews.26 Additional queries tailored to each 
interviewee allowed information to be maximized and limited off-topic 
conversation. This open approach probably allowed for more unexpected 
responses and profound reasoning to surface than strict adherence to a basic 
questionnaire would have. 
The interviews took place under varying circumstances and settings—in IDP 
camps, cars, hotel lobbies, offices, and cafés, for instance—and often on short 
notice. Interview character and length (from 20 minutes to 2 hours) also varied. 
Due to the complexity and shifting nature of the issue under loop in this study, 
and since actors at all levels of the response are involved in—or affected by—
coordination, it was conducted under the principle the more interviewees the 
better to attain theoretical saturation and greatest possible understanding. It should 
be mentioned, though, that given the changing nature of the situation and its 
infrastructure where committees, meetings, structures, and people come and go, 
complete coverage is not possible. Furthermore, the high turnover of staff—
especially within the UN and INGOs—complicated the search for information on 
initial response efforts since few had been there at that time. 
The field study made clear that ‟everything” in the KR-I “is politicized” 
(NGO3) and that all actors have an interest in portraying their results in the best 
light. Interdependency between actor categories has also affected responses. Some 
respondents answered ‟by the book” or repeated the official stance, rather than 
giving a more candid view. Others demanded anonymity27 in order to be able to 
speak more unreservedly. This was particularly striking among NGO represen-
tatives, of whom many were dependent on funding from the UN and therefore 
normally quiet in their views. This study is independent. But the simple fact that 
Sida—a large donor to the UN, INGOs, and indirectly the KRG—contributed to 
the funding of this study might also have affected responses. 
Besides the one-to-one interviews, my participation in field trips to IDP 
camps, coordination meetings, and cluster workshops further clarified the inner 
workings of emergency response coordination. These were incredibly valuable for 
verifying the results of the interviews. I also contacted several interviewees more 
than once to clarify information and validate stakeholder mapping.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26 See Appendix G for the interview guide. 
27 All interviewees participated in this study on a voluntary basis. 
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*Since a large number of interviews was done, and theoretical saturation, on the 
whole, was attained, references to specific interviewees will be made for 
quotations or for unique material. Otherwise, reference will only be made to the 
actor category. 
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5 IDP Response Coordination 
Structure 
To create an overview of the IDP response coordination structure in the KR-I—of 
both government and humanitarian actors—a stakeholder mapping28 and a survey 
of IDP meetings at different levels and in varying forums29 was done. Despite (or 
due to) the complexity of these documents, they illustrate the interlinkings 
between actors along with a profound lack of simplicity, and thus efficiency, in 
the IDP response coordination structure. Of course, many decisions and 
interaction forums are taken in an informal context, which such mappings cannot 
capture. Criticism that the mappings are not wholly current is valid; new 
committees, working groups and so on are continuously being established, while 
others exist on paper alone or have no mandate. (NCCI1;MERI2;KRG10) Never-
theless, no overall coordination structure of the entire KR-I response has yet been 
published, and stakeholders have been calling for just such an overview (cf. HCR 
2015). 
The following section describes the IDP response coordination mechanisms 
and meetings, as per the mappings. Government (the KRG) is discussed first, 
followed by the UN and NGOs. Brief mention is also made of the GoI and donors, 
who are influential players. 
5.1 Government 
5.1.1 The Government of Iraq 
As the prime responsible party for providing protection and humanitarian assis-
tance to all its citizens, irrespective of religion, ethnical association, or destination 
of refuge within the country (including the KR-I), the role of the GoI in the IDP 
response must be addressed. Although the GoI has provided some assistance to 
the KR-I, such as funding for some camps and cash to registered IDP families, 
most respondents agree that the GoI has not fulfilled its responsibility. By 
refusing to approve and allocate funds for the 2014 KR-I budget and—due to the 
crisis—suspending the Public Distribution System (PDS) for all citizens in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
28 See Appendix D (1) for the stakeholder and coordination mapping of the IDP response. 
29 See Appendix D (2) for the mapping of formalized IDP meetings for the three actor categories. 
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KR-I,30 resources among the regional government as well as IDPs and host 
community have been strained.31 Thus, the inadequate response of the GoI in the 
region has worsened the situation and forced the humanitarian community and 
international donors to shoulder a larger role than might have otherwise been 
necessary. (cf. HNO) 
On the national level, the GoI formed a High Committee in 2014 to respond to 
the IDP influx. The Committee comprises multiple ministries and includes the 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM).32 The Deputy Prime Minister 
chairs the Committee and meetings are arranged on a needs basis. According to 
interviews, the High Committee has branches (Operation Cells) in all KR-I 
governorates (KRG12;GoI1), but it is unclear what it really does. Apart from 
KRG Governors, who explained that cooperation between the High Committee in 
Baghdad and governorates is good, ministry interviews revealed that KRG 
receives limited, or no, information about actions and decisions taken by the GoI 
in response to the IDP emergency. (e.g., KRG2;10) Information sharing and 
coordination thus seem fragmented. 
The MoDM is represented in all three KR-I governorates, and also has daily 
contact with the High Committee Operation Cells. Alya Albazaz, Head of MoDM 
representation in Erbil, however, says that these are very political and—although 
inexperienced concerning displacement issues—do not ask for advice from the 
MoDM: ‟The result is that decisions are taken on a trial-and-error basis, for which 
the IDPs are suffering.”  
5.1.2 The Kurdistan Regional Government 
The KRG is a young government33 comprising 19 ministries and several depart-
ments and, as many interviewees have stressed, is ‟a capable government”. The 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers head the KRG.  
Several ministries and departments are in some way involved in the IDP re-
sponse, but no designated functioning body with a mandate and responsibility for 
the IDP response (e.g., to manage information, coordinate actions on the inter-
ministerial level, and cooperate with the international humanitarian community) is 
yet in place. According to interviews, the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the 
Ministry of the Interior (MoI) are the main ministries involved in response actions 
at the regional level; they report on humanitarian and security issues, respectively, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30 The PDS was set up in 1995 as part of the UN’s Oil-for-Food program and is the basis for assistance to all 
Iraqis (with a monthly salary of maximum 1 million Iraqi Dinar), providing essential food and non-food rations. 
(KRG10; IRIN 2007) 
31 For example, government officials, teachers and even peshmerga (Kurdish militia fighting ISIL) received no 
salary for several consecutive months in 2014. 
32 The MoDM was established in 2007 in response to the growing size of the internally displaced population. 
One of its main duties is to register IDPs and to provide IDPs food and non-food items. (GoI1) 
33 The KRG was established following parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992 . Iraqi forces had left the 
KR-I—following a Kurdish uprising against the GoI—and the region gained de facto autonomy. (KRG 2015b) 
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to the Cabinet. The three governorates—main implementers of the response—fall 
under the MoI, to which they report. 
At the time of this study, decisions concerning the IDP response were mainly 
taken during Cabinet meetings. A High IDP Committee34 had also been 
established in the KRG for discussing and preparing material so that the KRG 
Cabinet of Ministers could decide on IDP-related issues; the Committee itself 
could not take decisions. (KRG10;MERI2) There seems to be inadequate 
coordination between the national and regional high committees; “no one knows 
what comes out of those and how they are interlinked. No written policies or 
strategies are produced there.” (KRG7) 
In addition to KRG High Committee meetings, joint KRG-UN meetings are 
held on an ad hoc basis with relevant UN agencies to discuss the IDP response. 
For example, the MoP collaborated with OCHA in setting up Immediate Response 
Plans for the KR-I (IRP1 and IRP2).35 
On the regional level, the Bureau of Displacement and Migration (BoDM, 
under the KRG MoI) has a mandate similar to that of the MoDM36. The BoDM 
does not seem to be specifically involved in either High Committee or the joint 
KRG-UN meetings. Furthermore, in the eyes of the UN and NGOs, confusion 
exists regarding the difference, and even existence, of separate MoDM and 
BoDM. As Ms. Albazaz says: “the arrangement between MoDM, BoDM, High 
Committees and Operational Cells and also governorate emergency cells is not 
tidy, good, clear or efficient”. 
5.1.3 Governorates 
In the KR-I, the governorates had primary responsibility for managing on-the-
ground emergency response activities in the ongoing humanitarian crisis. The 
governorates are to a large extent self-governing and have separate directorates 
corresponding to the KRG ministries, working more operationally with their 
respective issues (e.g. education, health, and electricity).37 This may explain why 
governorates have managed the IDP response in different ways and why 
“decisions in Erbil can be taken without a go from the governorate level” 
(IASC3). 
Below is an account of how the Erbil and Duhok governorates have coordi-
nated the IDP response. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34 The KRG High IDP Committee includes the Minister of Planning, the Minister of Health, the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, the three KR-I governors, the Garmian and Rapareen Administrations, and members of the 
Presidency Office. (KRG10) 
35 See section 5.2 and 6.3 for response plans and strategies. 
36 The MoDM and BoDM do share IDP registration database. (GoI1) 
37 Mayors and sub-Mayors who are responsible for their respective districts and sub-districts are also important 
actors involved in the IDP response at the local level. The Mayors are not, however, included in this study. (See 
Appendix D (1) for the mapping of the response structure.) 
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Erbil 
In the Erbil governorate, the Governor has tasked the Erbil Refugee Council 
(ERC)—an emergency coordination cell—to coordinate IDP and refugee 
responses. Before summer, ERC capacity sufficed to manage the Syrian refugee 
situation. With the sudden influx of IDPs, however, the workload of the six 
employees at the ERC became overwhelming, where they also work cross-
functionally (liaising between the various directorates and with UN agencies, 
NGOs, the MoDM, and the BoDM). ‟We need resources internally to be able to 
coordinate and participate externally. Now we are more ’extinguishing fires’ than 
having a structured approach”. (KRG9) The ERC has no policy or ToR on which 
to base its work. 
Sometimes, the ERC hosts planning meetings to which directorates, 
ministries, and the Governor are invited to plan response activities. These are 
scheduled on a needs basis, just as bilateral meetings with UN agencies, NGOs 
and other governmental bodies. The ERC has a strong presence due to its head, 
Vian Rasheed, who has the professional and personal capacity to coordinate the 
work and also connections with the right people within the KRG. Since, in most 
cases, Ms. Rasheed has a decision-making mandate, the ERC functions. 
(Meeting6) Many interviewees, however, complain that dealing with the Erbil 
governorate is difficult and slow, though the KRG is generally perceived to have 
speedier processes than the UN. 
The governorate is responsible for the management and administration of IDP 
camps. Since neither the ERC nor the Erbil governorate in general has the 
resources to manage the four IDP camps in Erbil, ERC has assigned responsibility 
for this to various NGOs. For example, the Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF), a 
national organization, manages several camps. According to NGO interviewees, 
coordination with the Erbil governorate is most effective at the camp level, either 
through the camp manager who is in direct contact with the ERC or directly with 
the directorates responsible for the specific issues that need to be addressed. 
(NGO9;NNGO2)  
All partners—the KRG at the governorate level, UN agencies, and NGOs—
are expected to participate in camp coordination meetings.38 These meetings are 
the lowest level coordination meetings in the cluster approach. Several 
interviewees stress that the camp coordination meetings are the most useful, as the 
problems to be addressed are there in the camp. (e.g. NGO5;10) 
But even at this level, gaps and unclear roles and responsibilities between 
clusters, NGOs, and their sub-contractors (who often execute much of the work, 
like constructing shelters and drainage systems) as well as between the UN and 
government exist (NGO9;Meeting6). Compared with in refugee camps, coor-
dination and planning for and within the IDP camps seems problematic: donors 
and partners operate under varying standards (e.g., tents vs prefab caravans for 
shelter) with few or no lines of communication; IDPs arrive while camps are still 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
38 Camp coordination meetings are the responsibility of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management 
(CCCM) cluster, led by the UNHCR. The camp manager (e.g., an NGO or a governorate representative) heads 
these meetings and a UNHCR representative acts as co-chair. (Meeting6) 
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under construction; and the UNHCR and UNICEF do not coordinate on shelter or 
water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities, which should all be in place 
before occupation. This type of miscommunication, along with too many actors, 
prolongs processes and worsens outcome. (NGO9) 
 
Duhok 
Duhok is the smallest KR-I governorate39 and has been receiving most of the IDPs 
(about 850,000 individuals). (MFA 2014) In the summer of 2014, the host 
community assumed the main responsibility for the IDPs (providing food and 
shelter), when the KRG and humanitarian community were unable to act40. 
Responding to the overwhelming situation—though with limited resources 
owing to the Baghdad budget cut—the governorate established an Emergency 
Cell (EC) in August, tasked to deal with response efforts and coordination. The 
EC has coordinated the response with a firm hand. Chaired by the Vice-Governor, 
it invites all UN agencies, clusters, and NGOs to weekly IDP coordination 
meetings, to discuss response measures (e.g., IDP needs, milestones, gaps, and 
strategy). (IASC4;KRG4)  
All representatives from the various actor categories stress that the governorate 
leads emergency operations and coordination in Duhok; the EC is the focal point 
of the response, in direct contact daily with all mayors (who in turn have contact 
with their sub-mayors) as well as directorates, UN agencies, NGOs, and so on. In 
Duhok, all IDP matters must be coordinated with, and approved by, the mayors 
and the EC (which has frustrated many partners); “but processes are quick here, so 
it seems to work”. (IASC2) As Andrei Kazakov, senior field coordinator at the 
UNHCR, expressed:  
 
I have worked for UNHCR for 21 years, and I have never before seen this level 
of ability of authorities to […] coordinate with us, and have the capacity to 
respond to a crisis. Their capacity is outstanding! […] UN and NGOs are 
around, but it is really as a support to government. 
 
Although operating with an insufficient budget, the governorate has taken the lead 
in building IDP camps and has built six camps (with capacities for 3,000 families 
each), in a shorter time, for less money, and with a higher standard than the UN or 
INGOs have managed.41 (MFA 2014)  
The Duhok governorate runs all IDP camps through its Development 
Modification Center (DMC), which employs more than 200 engineers, camp 
managers, and the like, and has been in place since the Syrian refugee response 
began. This differs from in Erbil, where NGOs have been tasked to manage 
camps, although the UNHCR also supports camp management in Duhok. (KRG6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
39 The Duhok governorate has about 1.3 million inhabitants compared to Erbil’s 2 million inhabitants (2013). 
(KRG 2015a) 
40 Initially, the UN and INGOs had only a limited presence in Duhok. 
41 Such as less bureaucracy, shorter procurement processes, local knowledge and staff. (MFA 2014) 
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5.2 The Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN 
Operation 
The UN currently has an integrated mission in Iraq comprising the UN Assistance 
Mission to Iraq (UNAMI, the political leg) and the HCT (the humanitarian leg, 
supposedly apolitical and consisting of all UN agencies operating in the coun-
try),42 led by the humanitarian coordinator (HC).43 Both UNAMI and the HCT 
were operating in Iraq before summer 2014. In its refugee response operation, 
ongoing since the start of the Syrian war, the UNHCR leads sectors similar to the 
clusters that are activated in emergencies.44  
What several interviewees stress is that even before summer, the UN operation 
in Iraq was huge, inflexible, and ‟a bit over the top”. (KRG7) When the 
emergency was elevated to L3, the operation should have been simplified and 
streamlined. Instead, all UN agencies remained in the country, and OCHA was 
brought in to coordinate the IDP response: to support the HC and the HCT, the 
activated clusters, and other partners such as governments and donors. Interviews 
reveal that, as the largest UN agency in Iraq, the UNHCR was unwilling to let the 
HC and OCHA take the lead on the IDP response, although this division of labor 
had been clarified in a joint IASC-UNHCR paper on roles and responsibilities in a 
mixed situation45 (UNHCR-OCHA 2014). This led to internal squabbles and 
affected the response negatively. In the situation that emerged, parallel sectors and 
clusters, often with the same members, operated. What interviews revealed is that 
although OCHA, under the umbrella of the HC and HCT, is responsible for 
coordinating the IDP response, most government contacts concerning IDPs are 
still made with the UNHCR. (KRG4;9;12) 
There are ten clusters in this response,46 organized on three levels: national, 
regional (more strategic), and governorate (operational). So in Erbil, for example, 
three shelter cluster meetings are regularly held: one that supposedly discusses all 
of Iraq, one for all of the KR-I, and one for the Erbil governorate. In reality, the 
lines have blurred, resulting in numerous meetings with much discussion of the 
same topics and little result. 
Clusters should be set up to link to government mechanisms. But some 
clusters have found that difficult:  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
42 There are 22 UN agencies operating in Iraq. During HCT meetings, also the IOM participates, as well as 
donors and selected NGO representatives (See further, section 5.3.). 
43 The HC is also the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) and thus reports 
both to the head of UNAMI (the Special Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG) and to the 
global ERC, head of the IASC. (ToR 2011) The role of the DSRSG is therefore not completely separate 
from the political mission. (cf. HNO 2014) 
44 The sectors are led by the same agencies leading clusters globally. But if the sector lead agencies do not 
manage to finance sector activities, the UNHCR acts as a ‟provider of last resort”, with overall responsibility for 
the emergency response (e.g., NGO8).  
45 Mixed situation refers to a situation where both IDPs and refugees are in need of assistance. 
46 See Appendix D (1) for the activated clusters, in the stakeholder mapping. 
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… at the KR-I level it has been difficult to find a consistent counterpart, 
speaking for the whole of KRG. Therefore, both clusters and government have 
connected back to governorates. The emergency cells [e.g. ERC] are however 
multi-sectoral, which means that ministries/directorates are hardly ever 
involved. (NGO8) 
 
How clusters operate has, in the case of Iraq, been up to the clusters and their 
coordinators, for example, regarding government involvement in the cluster, how 
needs assessments are done, and how duplication of effort as well as gaps are 
avoided. There are tools and mechanisms developed globally for how clusters 
should work; however, they have not been properly applied in the KR-I, owing to 
lack of both leadership and guidance from OCHA as well as from the global 
cluster lead agencies (GCLA) for the respective clusters. (e.g., IASC13;15) In 
January 2015—six months after L3 went into effect—several clusters still had no 
operational strategy or workplan. (NGO8;IASC11) 
All actor categories have criticized OCHA for its role in the IDP response. 
Although it has indeed been difficult to enter as a junior player and manage this 
response, it has not fulfilled the basic requirements of its role. For example, no 
MIRA was done in the KR-I. (Meeting3;NGO5;7)  
OCHA’s role is to supply the HC and HCT with accurate information for 
decision-making—OCHA itself has no decision-making mandate—but inter-
viewees are critical of its ability to track, manage, and above all analyze 
information. ‟Many scattered assessments have been done by NGOs, but nothing 
has come out of it. UN says that the data can be used and analyzed by anyone. But 
it has not been analyzed by the UN.” (NGO5) 
OCHA also seems not to have followed standard guidelines for drafting re-
sponse plans. After L3 was declared, the SRP seems to have been revised almost 
overnight47—with little involvement of the KRG or GoI—and with core cluster 
teams adapting objectives, activities, and so on, to new circumstances within 48 
hours (so as to be able to receive feedback from cluster participants within 24 
hours) in templates not adapted to the Iraq context (NGO12;IASC15).48 Despite 
being an ‟absurd process” concerning assessment, analysis, and priority-setting 
concerning time, as one interviewee expressed it, OCHA ‟let all clusters dream”: 
every imaginable project was included in the final SRP, and OCHA did not 
question the figures or set limits. (IASC15) The result was an SRP for USD 2.2 
billion which ‟all donors rejected” because it ‟lack[ed] strategic thinking”. 
(NGO12;KRG7) As the British Department for International Development 
(DFID) clarified, an SRP should include needs assessments with corresponding 
response strategies and a detailed budget, none of which had been done at a 
satisfactory level in Iraq. (DFID 2014) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
47 An SRP for Iraq was done in spring 2014, following the crisis in Anbar in January of that year.  
48 It has been difficult to form a comprehensive picture of how the SRP process did indeed proceed, due to high 
staff turnover within OCHA and the humanitarian community as a whole. Few interviewees were both in the 
KR-I and participants to the drafting of the SRP in September 2014. 
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In autumn 2014, two immediate response plans (IRP1 and IRP2) targeting the 
KR-I were set up—together with the KRG—to address the most immediate needs 
and vulnerable groups (also for the winter). These plans had no clear links to the 
SRP and were just as ‟generic and difficult to work from” as the SRP. (IASC11) 
Furthermore, it has not been clear to donors or other stakeholders how these plans 
are related, which has raised questions about the accuracy of the figures.49 As the 
response plans have produced little funding compared with what was desired, 
clusters and UN agencies have begun to bypass OCHA and appeal directly to 
donors for financial support. In January 2015, the major UN agencies (e.g., WFP, 
UNICEF, and UNHCR) were facing lack of funding by March, which would also 
affect the NGOs these agencies supported. (IASC5;15) 
OCHA itself has no funding and does not implement projects;50 it only 
coordinates. Besides managing information and supporting appeals processes, 
OCHA chairs national inter-cluster meetings weekly. These are supposed to 
prevent siloization between the clusters and facilitate inter-cluster responses.  All 
cluster coordinators participate in these and are responsible for feeding back 
information to the cluster; there is no formal reporting mechanism. They should 
also brief their heads of agencies51 on concerns and developments in their 
respective clusters, so that these in turn can take the message further to the HCT. 
Only heads of agencies participate in the HCT meetings, and meeting minutes are 
only shared with HCT members, which means that vital information might never 
reach either cluster coordinators or clusters. Likewise, cluster information might 
never reach the HCT. (NCCI1;IASC14)  
5.3 Non-Governmental Organizations 
A large number of national and international NGOs give aid to IDPs in the KR-I; 
some have much experience from dealing with emergencies elsewhere, and others 
not. Some were already operating with the refugee response, but many arrived 
specifically for the IDP response.  
Many INGOs participate in the clusters at some level, but very few have 
sufficient resources to commit themselves to appropriate cluster participation 
(e.g., INGOs send different representatives to cluster meetings [discontinuity], or 
attendance is sporadic).52 A few clusters have INGO representatives as co-chairs 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
49 In addition to the SRP and the two IRPs, there is also the 3RP (Regional, Refugee and Resilience Plan), 
drafted by the UNHCR in response to the Syrian crisis. 
50 Other UN agencies contract both NGOs and other implementing partners for projects, and also the government 
itself.  
51 This means that e.g. the cluster coordinator of the shelter cluster should brief the head of UNHCR before HCT 
meetings. 
52 It is questionable whether cluster participants live up to the minimum requirements (cf. Appendix C) in the 
KR-I, or if cluster coordinators even require this . (Meeting3;5;7) 
  24 
(e.g., the shelter cluster), enabling them to participate in inter-cluster meetings 
where there is no further NGO representation.  
The NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI)53 is mandated to facilitate 
coordination among NGOs as well as information sharing and NGO advocacy. 
Although the NCCI is not well-known to all partners, it organizes coordination 
meetings to address common issues which it can take to the HCT for action. The 
NCCI is a member of the HCT, along with five NGOs,54 and participates in HCT 
meetings. These meetings, however, are irregular (often scheduled only 2–3 days 
in advance), which makes it difficult for the NCCI to arrange preparatory 
meetings with its NGO members for valuable input. 
Yet again, there are also many NGOs—international, but especially national—
who do not coordinate with the UN (through the clusters), and hardly with the 
KRG, and set up their own projects with no consideration of the bigger picture; 
‟they act as if it is their mission to be here, although no one asked them to come”. 
(MERI2) This creates confusion and frustration within the clusters and 
government since plans, policies, and needs priorities are disregarded. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
53 The NCCI, established in 2003, has 80 members, of which 2/3 consists of INGOs and 1/3 of national NGOs.  
54 The NGO HCT members include the NRC, DRC, MAG, IRC, and SC. (NCCI1;IASC5) 
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6 Factors Affecting Coordination 
 
 
The overall message from all actor categories—with some exceptions—is that 
coordination is insufficient at all levels in this response: on both the horizontal 
and the vertical level, and thus, both within as well as between the actor categories 
(e.g., between governorates and the KRG at ministerial level, between different 
ministries, UN agencies, clusters and NGOs). Although the stakeholder mapping 
might give the impression that the response structure is a well integrated 
network—with clear lines of reporting and flows of information and funding as 
well as assigned roles and responsibilities and well-thought-out decision-making 
processes—this is not the reality. Rather, there are many gaps and overlappings in 
this structure, on both the KRG and the humanitarian side. The IDP response 
structure could be viewed as a fragmented network that contains many sub-
networks—like specific clusters and governorate emergency cells—some of 
which are more integrated and operate better than others (e.g. the EC in Duhok); 
but on the whole, as a policy network dealing with the IDP response, it seems to 
operate poorly. 
The factors—both exogenous and endogenous—responsible for the weak 
coordination among the actors involved in this complex response are many and 
interrelated. Below follows an attempt to address the main ones discovered during 
the field study. 
6.1 Weak Leadership, Unsystematic and 
Dysfunctional Structure 
From the sides of both the UN and the government,55 leadership in terms of a 
formal strategy and policy at the top level that steers the work of the agencies, 
governorates, and clusters has been lacking. The only steering documents appear 
to be the SRP and IRPs, which most interviewees consider to be only appeal 
documents and difficult to work from. This has resulted in actors going their own 
way and acting in a reactive ad hoc way, rather than planned and systematic. 
Observing the two governorates, which use completely different approaches, or 
the clusters, which have each developed their own working methods, makes this 
clear.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
55 This applies to both the GoI and the KRG. 
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For example, roles and responsibilities in the clusters and in the camps should 
be clearly laid out in the 4W system. But implementation of the 4Ws is 
inconsistent, both between and within the clusters;56 there is no common tool that 
all partners use,57 so compilation of data, follow-up of gaps, and so on is difficult 
at both the cluster and the overall level. To avoid duplication and gaps, the 4Ws 
must be more detailed and quantifiable, and all partners must update and feed in, 
but due to lack of resources and time as well as for competitive reasons,58 it does 
not appear as if this will happen. And even if the division of labor is clearly laid 
out in a cluster meeting, ‟you cannot always find the effect in the field”. (NGO9) 
Both within and between clusters, siloization is apparent and coordination weak; 
no 4Ws for inter-cluster coordination exist, although they are needed because the 
fine lines between clusters are sometimes unclear. 
‟It is difficult to lead a cluster when you don’t know how it should work.” 
(IASC13) This statement captures the problem of unclear technology that many 
cluster coordinators have faced in the absence of tools, training and previous 
experience. The result has been weak leadership also at the cluster level—often 
biased toward the head UN agency, which fails to create a sense of equal 
partnership—that reduces trust, and participation and information sharing by 
cluster participants. Several interviewees have also expressed that they do not 
know what the cluster meetings are for: ‟waste of time”, ‟they give nothing”, 
‟just NGO representatives showing off”—too little time is spent on real IDP 
needs and how to address them. (e.g., NGO6;10;11;KRG4) 
In the absence of more formalized and systematic information channels 
between actors, the response has been very person dependent. Clusters with 
strong, unbiased, and experienced cluster coordinators have worked well; but 
according to interviews, many persons at top positions in this response have not 
been strong individuals (e.g., the HC and the head of OCHA), which has had a 
negative impact on the whole response. Personal chemistry and trust between 
counterparts play a vital role when information is to be shared and agreements 
made. The lines of information within and between clusters, as well as vertically 
(to/from HCT), depends solely on individuals; and in this response, high staff 
turnover at the UN agencies and the INGOs has been a major problem. Of course, 
networks and informal information channels never get a chance to become institu-
tionalized—and thus reach high levels of effectiveness—when the people 
enabling them are continuously changing.59 All these factors that lead to 
discontinuity also have a negative impact on how donors as well as the 
government or NGOs perceive accountability in the UN coordination system. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
56 The 4Ws can be structured on a geographical, activity or thematic level, for example, and with varying degrees 
of detail. (IASC13) 
57 The clusters usually use Excel files, which cluster participants update. There is also the Activity Info portal, 
which for example, many camp managers use and the KRG likes, but it has not been adapted to the needs of all 
clusters, which makes some clusters hesitant to use it. The food security cluster, for example, has its own 
information management tool, which was globally developed specifically for the food security cluster. (IASC10) 
58 See further section 6.2 for competitive elements. 
59 OCHA staff, for example, have had short deployments of 4-8 weeks. 
  27 
What interviewees have further stressed is a general anomaly of the cluster 
system: OCHA’s role. Cluster lead agencies are accountable for their own 
clusters—and should fill any gaps if no implementing partners are able to do so—
‟but this responsibility does not go further up [to OCHA or the HC/IASC]”. 
(IASC8;NGO8) Furthermore, as OCHA has no decision-making mandate, it 
cannot delegate tasks to cluster lead agencies. Thus, perhaps not only IASC 
leadership has been weak in the KR-I; perhaps the structure of the humanitarian 
response itself is inadequate, in which the roles of the HC and of OCHA lead to 
further fragmentation and dispersement of power in the network. 
6.2 Competition, Scarce Resources, and Many Actors  
Lack of resources—human and financial—has echoed throughout the field study 
as the main constraining factor in the IDP response. Due to the insufficient 
budget, the KRG finds itself in a continuing financial crisis and dependent on 
external assistance to meet the IDP needs. Thus, interdependence between the 
KRG and the other actor categories exists, since ‟you must have government buy 
in to get things done” (NGO5). Compared to in a refugee response, where most 
funding goes through the UNHCR who ‟coordinates by directing tasks to 
implementing partners” (NGO8), funding of an IDP response can flow through 
any UN agency or directly from donors to NGOs or other partners. Distribution of 
resources is therefore fragmented, and hence also power (the government aside, 
without funding, an agency has no role in the response and no means of survival). 
Besides being dispersed from the hands of diverse actors, funding has been 
insufficient.60 As network theory explains, the fewer the resources and the more 
fragmented they are, the more competitive the mode of the network becomes. 
And, according to experienced emergency responders interviewed, this element 
has been extreme in the KR-I; between UN agencies and the NGOs, competition 
for resources is so intense that they neither cooperate nor speak with each other.61 
Further, due to the dearth of qualified, experienced staff,62 actors also compete for 
staff, recruiting from each other. This competitive element—together with the 
unsystematized and dysfunctional coordination structure addressed above—has a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
60 Interviewees speak of donor fatigue—due to global financial constraints as well as simultaneous emergencies 
(e.g., Ebola)—in addition to skepticism about the content of the appeal documents in Iraq. It has been stressed 
that donors perceive Iraq as a middle-income country that should be able to fund the IDP response itself. Most 
interviewees emphasize that this is problematic, considering the context-specific circumstances, such as the GoI-
KRG conflict; the war against ISIL; and the fact that in addition to the IDPs and refugees, many Iraqis still live 
in poverty. The global drop in oil price has not improved the GoI budget, as Iraq is a highly oil-dependent 
economy. 
61 In emergencies where more funding has been available, cooperation between actors has been better, for 
example, in Haiti. (NGO8) 
62 Recruiting emergency staff to Iraq appears to have been difficult, especially for longer engagements. Other 
ongoing emergencies reduce the personnel available for Iraq, so many INGOs work with a skeleton staff. 
(NGO8;IASC15)  
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negative impact on any trust participants have for the response coordination, and 
affects their participation (e.g. not sharing information, boosting their own data 
and results, fluid participation, etc.). This in turn causes a situation where the 
trustworthiness of information and the situational picture (number and location of 
the IDPs, their needs, and who is providing assistance) is questioned, further 
hampering coordination within and between all actor categories. 
6.3 Differing Perceptions and Priorities 
Related to the issue of competition between actors are individual objectives and 
strivings, and varying views on how to respond to the emergency. For the KRG—
which is simultaneously experiencing a financial crisis, a dispute with the GoI, 
and most importantly, fighting and financing a war against the ISIL—providing 
basic assistance to the IDPs is a secondary priority, primary is security against 
terrorism and security for the host community. But for the humanitarian 
community, IDP needs and a sustainable solution for the IDPs should be first 
priority. (KRG3;7)  
These differences in preferences and priorities—also given the uncertainty in 
when and if the IDPs can return, or if even an additional IDP influx can be 
expected63—has an impact on where IDP issues stand on the agenda, and on the 
solutions that are deemed best suitable to address these. The KRG has viewed the 
IDP presence in the KR-I as temporary64—that the IDPs will soon be able to 
return to their homes—which has given rise to a strategy of building camps for 
IDPs outside city limits, separate from the host communities.65 The humanitarian 
community was initially against this idea, because experience has shown that this 
option is problematic and unsustainable since IDPs are not integrated, and 
managing camps is expensive over time.  
Some NGO representatives, however, feel that the KRG has managed to 
promote its interests with the UN and made the IRPs into ‟KRG blueprints”; they 
include only the clusters prioritized by the KRG. (NGO8;12) One view is that the 
KRG is using the response coordination network to mobilize resources—through 
the UN and INGOs—to fund the solutions that they consider best (cf. network 
theory). NGO representatives imply that the HCT has become political in its 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
63 In the interviews, it was stressed that planned interventions of the Peshmerga and the coalition against the ISIL 
(e.g., to take back Mosul) would likely have the initial effect of more IDPs fleeing to the KR-I, as a minimum. 
(KRG6;12) 
64 Recently, the KRG has begun to realize that it will take years to return the infrastructure to a state that will 
allow the IDPs to return to their homes, even with an ISIL defeat. (KRG6;10;12) 
65 Although the IDPs are Iraqi citizens, many are Sunni Arabs—not Kurds; this is a complicating element and a 
perceived security threat due to the ethnical and political makeup of Iraq. Paradoxally, the refugees from Syria—
Kurdish Syrians—have been treated better, on the whole being more well integrated and receiving more 
citizenship rights, than many of the IDP groups (which include Christians, other minority groups, and Sunni 
Arabs). (MERI1;2) 
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dealings66—and the UN mission is indeed integrated (including both political and 
humanitarian legs)—which has a humanitarian cost; ‟the response has suffered 
from the sovereignty issue”. (NGO12) NGOs have also been requesting more 
transparency on how decisions between the UN and the KRG/GoI are made. 
Furthermore, NGOs feel that little attention is being paid to their views in this 
response; “the UN does not really listen to the NGOs. They pay lip service, but in 
reality, they have no influence”. (NGO12) The humanitarian voice and the real, 
on-the-ground needs are not considered enough; this is visible, for example, in the 
focus of the response on camp areas, while large groups of IDPs continue to live 
in areas outside of the camps, and with unidentified needs.  
With these varying perceptions and priorities, it becomes more and more 
difficult to find a common ground that the three categories of response actors can 
agree on. And what has become apparent is that the NGOs, especially those 
independent of UN funding, continue to act autonomously, without coordinating, 
within and outside of the camps.  
On the other hand, others express that the UN and the KRG—whose relations 
are said to be good by an overwhelming majority—only pretend to coordinate and 
in reality have separate coordination mechanisms. Thus, stemming from actors’ 
varying priorities and objectives, separate response mechanisms—formal and 
informal—arise. 
6.4 A Self-Serving and (Cost) Inefficient Mechanism 
Bureaucratic procedures, long supply chains, inflexibility, ‟template thinking”,  
non-transparency, and (cost) inefficiency are expressions constantly used to 
describe UN efforts in the KR-I. Both the KRG and the NGOs have aired their 
frustration about the UN lack of adaptability, acting as business-as-usual in a 
situation of emergency.67 For example, it has taken up to six months to receive 
UN funding for NGO project implementation. (Annex 2014) Still, most donors 
choose to fund through the UN (e.g., all Saudi funds went to UN agencies, filtered 
by OCHA68, to further contract partners [e.g. NGOs] for project implementation). 
This makes the UN a major actor in coordinating this response.  
Several interviewees stress that funds would be spent more efficiently—more 
reaching the beneficiaries sooner—if they were allocated directly to the NGOs 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
66 Some interviewees feel that the UN has taken sides in the GoI–KRG dispute; some clusters invite the KRG but 
not the GoI to their meetings. (NGO12) 
67 Also, separation of the IDP and refugee responses stems from UN inflexibility, which failed to combine a 
solution to the developing IDP situation with the one already in place for Syrian refugees. Instead, the UN 
created a second, parallel response coordination structure that addresses similar needs and involves the same 
actors, with constrained resources and time. 
68 Still, many interviewees—especially NGO representatives—request a thorough account of how the Saudi 
donation has been spent. It was not done through the clusters, and UN agencies like UNESCO—not directly 
involved in the emergency response—received funds. Interviewees complain about lack of transparency within 
the UN apparatus. (KRG7;NCCI1;NGO12) 
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(international or national). Of donations to or through the UN, 25%–45% disap-
pear in high salaries and other administrative costs. Because the contracted 
INGOs also have high administrative costs, only a small share of funds now reach 
the IDPs. (NNGO2; KRG7;IASC16)69 Cutting out the UN would eliminate at 
least one middleman. 
 Funding the KRG directly was another proposed alternative; although funding 
a regional government in a country where corruption70 is widespread might be 
politically sensitive to international donors, some interviewees—and not only 
KRG representatives—felt more of the funds would reach the IDPs. Haval 
Amedy, Head of the Emergency Cell in Duhok, expressed that, ‟if we got 30% of 
the donations, we could solve the IDP problems. We are confident about that, with 
very tight monitoring on us”. Except for cutting costs,71 national stakeholders 
know the culture and the market (where to find suitable and cheap material) 
better, but most importantly, they will stay on the ground, whether the UN is there 
or not.  
Very few national NGOs receive funding from the UN or are involved in the 
clusters. Both the KRG and some cluster representatives have stressed that 
involvement and capacity building by the national NGOs and the government are 
crucial for the long-term sustainability of this response, in view of a UN pullout at 
some future date (depending on financial and political conditions). Such requests 
are ‟not sweet music in the ears of the UN”, (KRG9) since it has MoUs with the 
large INGOs (e.g., NRC and DRC) that they involve in responses worldwide. 
Because the UN mainly contracts the same INGOs, which are usually the most 
active cluster participants, UN-led clusters risk becoming self-referential 
coordinating mechanisms. Thus, the UN and these INGOs reinforce each other in 
the response, knowingly or unknowingly shutting out other actors. 
The self-serving characteristic of the humanitarian response is voiced by many 
interviewees; rather than discussing the needs of the IDPs, discussions often 
center on the needs of the organizations. Some interviewees found it remarkable 
that all UN agencies were maintaining a presence in the KR-I—and receiving 
funding for the emergency—despite the shortage of funding. In January 2015, two 
months before the Saudi funds would run out, the UN had made no cuts in staff, 
although far from the most basic needs of the IDPs were being met. 
(IASC15;KRG7) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
69 In a best-case scenario, if adminstrative costs at the UN were 25% and at the INGOs, 25%, roughly 56% of a 
donation reaches the intended recipient: the IDPs. In a worst-case scenario, if adminstrative costs were 45% at 
the UN and at the INGOs, only 30% of the original donated amount would reach the beneficiaries. 
70 Corruption in the KRG is not perceived to be as bad as in the rest of Iraq. However, that is a small accolade, 
given that Iraq is ranked 170st/175 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2014).  
71 E.g. government already pays staff salaries, and national NGOs have lower salaries and security arrangements. 
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7 Concluding Remarks 
The complexity of the humanitarian emergency in the KR-I—of which the IDP 
situation is a large part—cannot be underestimated. And to coordinate a response 
that meets the needs of IDPs whose number, location, and condition are 
continuously changing can never be simple. However, the overall IDP response 
coordination structure72 that emerged in the KR-I—between the government, the 
UN, and the NGOs—appears to be an unnecessarily non-uniform, unsystematized, 
bureaucratic, and largely person-dependent ad hoc arrangement. The structure has 
both gaps and overlappings, and most implementation occurs on the governorate 
level.  
The UN operation and its cluster coordination system appear to be too 
complex and inflexible, and indeed too cost-inefficient, to adequately respond to 
the emergency in the KR-I. Weak central leadership—from the sides of both the 
UN and the KRG—has negatively impacted coordination at all levels, where 
governorates, clusters, and individual actors are responding to the emergency in 
their own ways. Among the actors, this has decreased trust in the coordination 
system itself as well as in the capabilities and objectives of other stakeholders. 
Characteristics of organized anarchies, such as unclear technology and 
problematic preferences, depict some of the major constraining elements to 
efficient coordination.  
In a situation of such uncertainty as this one, it is admittedly difficult to have 
rational, fully informed objectives. Still, perceived solutions for action in this 
emergency response vary widely among the actor categories—probably due in 
part to the various roles they play—and the line between politics and humanitarian 
needs often becomes blurred. Apart from making cooperation more difficult, lack 
of consensus complicates joint policy and strategy making, as does lack of a 
consistent, long-term strategy for how to respond to the emergency. 
Fluid participation is another problem; the short-term deployments within the 
UN and the INGOs constrain continuity, especially in the absence of formal 
systematized structures. Inconsistency in cluster coordination participation, owing 
to factors such as time constraints, understaffing, and the feeling that cluster 
meetings are unnecessary and ‟too many” is prevalent. National NGOs, who 
could safeguard continuity and be responsible for more long-term interventions, 
have so far, by and large, been excluded from the clusters and coordination 
structure. 
What has become obvious is the competitiveness imbuing the whole response; 
all individual actors (from UN agencies and ministries to the NGOs) compete for 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
72 See Appendix D for an overview of the IDP response coordination structure. 
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funds, projects, and staff. Since these elements are incredibly scarce, and 
distributors are many because no one agency is responsible for IDP needs (besides 
the government, which has no funds), the response coordination structure could be 
typified as a fragmented network of sub-networks (e.g., clusters and governorate 
emergency cells). The few sub-networks that seem to be more integrated and well-
functioning than the rest is largely due to strong individuals (policy entrepreneurs) 
who are solution-oriented and able to adapt to new situations.  
Overall, however, fragmentation is comprehensive with few consistent KRG-
UN-NGO counterparts, which might explain why no one has a complete overview 
of the response structure (who is doing what, and who is funding who).  The high 
competitiveness that characterizes most groups is another constraining element;  
actors tend to hoard information, and not share, which makes impossible a 
complete analysis of IDP needs, gaps, and joint strategies for addressing these 
(fragmented policies). Government, however, is the highest authority responsible 
for rule of law, and all should coordinate with it to get things done. Interviewees 
in all categories believe that the response has been led by the KRG, despite its 
limited financial resources. 
The current humanitarian emergency could be viewed as a policy window, a 
chance for policy change and increased coordination between involved actors. 
Relations are indeed closer now than before last summer, and joint cooperation 
has emerged. But for the reasons discussed in this thesis—and due to the 
complexity of the situation in the KR-I itself (e.g., the KRG–GoI dispute, the 
budgetary crisis, the ISIL war, and spillover from the crisis in Syria)—meeting the 
huge needs of the IDPs in a planned, sustainable and coordinated way remains a 
great challenge.73 Still, compared with the attempts at IDP responses in the rest of 
Iraq, response coordination in the KR-I functions relatively well. As one 
interviewee stated: ‟no theory can fully explain the case of Iraq.” (NGO2) 
7.1 Future Questions 
The outcomes of this study raise questions about the efficiency of the current 
approach to coordinating and executing an IDP response. Is it really efficient for 
such a large number of (UN) agencies to be involved, who compete against each 
other and are coordinated by an actor that cannot be held accountable for the 
response? Empiricism and theory suggest that a more streamlined and transparent 
response structure, with one responsible lead agency to coordinate funding and 
lessen competition, would be more efficient. Would efficiency be increased even 
more if donors funded the NGOs and local agencies, or even the government, 
directly without using the UN as an intermediary?  
Future enquiries will tell. The rising number of IDPs around the world is 
significantly higher than of refugees, and the issue of how to best respond to IDP 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
73 See Appendix H for recent, more optimistic developments that give reason for a slightly improved outlook. 
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needs is pressing, especially in situations where government is unable to respond 
adequately—as in the KR-I—or is the cause of their displacement. 
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Appendix A: Internal Displacement 
Trends to the KR-I 
Key observed displacement trends to the KR-I (6 June to 18 August 2014). 
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Appendix B: Clusters 
Below is an overview of all global clusters and cluster leads (both UN and non-
UN agencies). Clusters are activated on a needs basis; not all clusters are active 
in each emergency.74 
 
 
 
Source: OCHA 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
74 See Appendix D (1) for the clusters activated in the emergency response in the KR-I. 
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Appendix C: Minimum Commitments 
for Participation in Clusters  
Below are the minimum commitments required for participation in clusters (by all 
partners, such as NGO representatives, other implementing partners, and govern-
ment representatives).  
 
 
• A common commitment to humanitarian principles and the Principles of 
Partnership 
 
• Readiness to participate in actions that specifically improve accountability to 
affected populations. 
 
• Commitment to consistently engage in the cluster’s collective work, and 
capacity to contribute. 
 
• Commitment to ensure optimal use of resources, and sharing information on 
organizational resources. 
 
• Willingness to take on leadership responsibilities as needed and as capacity and 
mandates allow. 
 
• Contribute to developing and disseminating advocacy and messaging for 
relevant audiences. 
 
 
Source: IASC 
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Appendix D: IDP Response 
Coordination Structure in the KR-I 
The following two pages present (1) a stakeholder mapping of the response coor-
dination structure (including interlinkings) and (2) a mapping of the formalized 
IDP response meetings including the three actor categories. 
 
The symbols below are used to facilitate reading and understanding of both 
documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
**For more information about the 17 additional KRG ministries not specified in the mapping, see 
KRG’s official website. 
  Level of decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue-marked figures represent GoI (the lighter the shade, the lower the level) 
Purple-marked figures represent KRG (the lighter the shade, the lower the level) 
Green-marked figures represent IASC/UN (the lighter the shade, the lower the level) 
Red-marked figures represent NGOs (and other implementing partners)  
Figures marked in light-red and dark-blue are not included in the study, but are 
included in the response. Donors in particular fund large parts of the 
humanitarian response. 
Main financial flow 
Main information flow 
Organizational linking 
Dashed arrows indicate questionable, weak or non-existent flows of funds or 
information. 
 
Actor category marked with a purple dot connected to a meeting forum has limited 
participation in this. 
 Meeting forum 
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Appendix D (1): Stakeholder mapping 
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Appendix E: List of Interviewees 
The interviewees are listed by category group, sorted by date.  
 
 
 
 
GoI1 Ms. Alya Hussain Albazaz 
 Head of the MoDM Representation in the KR-I, Erbil (2015-01-27) 
 
 
 
 
KRG1 Mr. Shorsh Kadir Rahem 
 KRG Representative to Sweden (2014-11-06) 
 
KRG2 Mr. Hoshang Mohamed 
Senior Director (Head of the Joint Crisis Center [JCC]), Directorate of 
KRG Offices Abroad (2014-11-24) 
 
KRG3 Mr. Karwan Jamal Tahir 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations, Department of Foreign Relations 
(2014-12-01) 
 
KRG4 Mr. Haval Mohammed Amedy 
Head of the Emergency Cell, Duhok Governorate  
(2014-12-02) 
 
KRG5 Mr. Ismail Mohamed  
 Vice-Governor of Duhok (2014-12-03) 
 
KRG6 Mr. Idris Saleh 
 Head of the DMC, Duhok Governorate (2014-12-04) 
 
KRG7 Mr. Archie D Lightfoot, Senior Advisor to the Minister of Interior (2014-12-
10; 2015-01-18) 
 
KRG8 Ms. Vian Rasheed 
 Head of the ERC, Erbil Governorate (2014-12-09) 
 
KRG9 Mr. Peter Jochi 
Emergency Response Advisor to the ERC, Erbil Governorate (DRC) 
(2014-12-09) 
Government	  of	  Iraq 
Kurdistan	  Regional	  Government 
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KRG10 Mr. Hayder Mustafa Saaid 
Director General of Development Coordination and Cooperation, 
Ministry of Planning (2014-12-11; 2015-01-21) 
 
KRG11 Mr. Shokr Yassen  
Director of Bureau of Migration and Displacement, Ministry of Interior 
(2014-12-15) 
 
KRG12 Mr. Nawzad Hadi Mawlood 
 Governor of Erbil (2014-12-18) 
 
 
 
 
IASC1 Ms. Azhee Amin 
National Program Officer, Integrated Coordination Office for 
Development & Humanitarian Affairs (ICODHA), UNAMI  
(2014-11-19) 
 
IASC2 Mr. Vincent Matteau 
Shelter and Settlement Programme Support Officer, IOM, Duhok  
(2014-12-02) 
 
IASC3 Ms. Wan Sophonpanich, Shelter and Settlement Programme Officer, IOM, 
Duhok (2014-12-03) 
 
IASC4 Mr. Andrei Kazakov 
 Senior Field Coordinator, UNHCR, Duhok (2014-12-03) 
 
IASC5 Ms. Diana Gee-Silverman 
 Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA (2014-12-08; 2015-01-28) 
 
IASC6 Mr. Lado Gvilava 
 Head of the IOM Regional Hub – Northern Iraq, Erbil (2014-12-09) 
 
 IASC7 Anonymous 1 
UN agency representative, with outside perspective on Clusters  
(2014-12-10) 
 
IASC8 Mr. Geoff Wordley 
Senior Operations Coordinator/Inter-Sector Coordinator, UNHCR  
(2014-12-11) 
 
IASC9 Mr. Abel Augustinio 
Inter-Agency WASH Rapid Assessment Team (IRAT) Coordinator, 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
(2014-12-14) 
IASC	  /	  UN	  Agencies 
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IASC10 Mr. Paolo Romano 
Information Management Officer, Food Security Cluster, FAO (2014-
12-18) 
  
IASC11 Anonymous 2 
 IASC member, actively involved in Clusters (2015-01-23) 
 
IASC12 Ms. Özgül Özcan 
 Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA (2015-01-24) 
 
IASC13 Mr. David Alford 
Information Manager Officer, Global WASH Rapid Response Team 
(2015-01-25) 
 
IASC14 Anonymous 3 
 Member of Protection Cluster (2015-01-28) 
 
IASC15 Dr. Alaa Abou Zeid  
 Health Cluster Coordinator, WHO (2015-01-28) 
 
IASC16 Mr. Ali Al-Khateeb 
 WASH Specialist, UNICEF (2015-01-29) 
 
 
 
 
NGO1 Mr. Johan Robertsson 
Team Leader for the establishment of the JCC, Security Advisor, MSB  
(2014-11-17) 
 
NGO2 Mr. Tom Robinson  
 Director, RISE Foundation (2014-11-19) 
 
NGO3 Anonymous 4 
 NGO representative, not involved in Clusters (2014-11-22) 
 
NGO4 Mr. Sema Panboon 
Team Leader for setting up IDP Camp Shaykhan, Duhok, MSB  
(2014-11-25) 
 
NGO5 Anonymous 5 
 NGO representative also actively involved in Clusters (2014-11-26) 
 
NGO6 Mr. Bernd Körber 
 Head of Mission, THW (Federal Agency for Technical Relief) (2014-12-01) 
 
INGOs	  (including	  other	  implementing	  partners) 
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NGO7 Anonymous 6 
 NGO representative, involved in assessment work (2014-12-10) 
 
NGO8 Anonymous 7 
NGO representative also actively involved in Clusters (2014-12-11) 
 
NGO9 Anonymous 8 
NGO representative also involved in Clusters and funded by the UN  
(2014-12-17) 
 
NGO10 Anonymous 9 
NGO representative also involved in Clusters and funded by the UN 
(2015-01-20) 
 
NGO11 Mr. Hani Chatila 
 WASH Program Manager, World Vision (2015-01-21) 
 
NGO12  Anonymous 10 
 Senior NGO representative, involved in Clusters (2015-01-29) 
 
 
 
 
NCCI1 Mr. Craig Anderson 
 North Field Coordinator, NCCI (2014-11-26; 2015-01-26) 
 
 
 
 
NNGO1 Mr. Hemn Farid 
 General Manager, Kurdistan Organisation for Volunteers (OVK)  
 (2014-11-27) 
 
NNGO Mr. Musa Ahmad 
 Deputy Head, Barzani Charity Foundation (2015-01-20) 
 
 
 
MERI1 Mr. Roger Guiu  
Research Fellow (Economics, Energy and Environment), Project 
Leader for the project Impact of Displaced People on Kurdistan Region, 
Middle East Research Institute (MERI) (2014-11-24) 
 
MERI2 Ms. Lahib Higel 
Research Assistant, involved with the project Impact of Displaced 
People on Kurdistan Region, MERI (2014-11-24)  
NCCI 
National	  NGOs 
Researchers 
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Appendix F: Field Visits and Meetings 
Field visits and meetings are listed by date. 
 
 
Meeting1 General coordination meetings, chaired by OCHA  
UN Compound, Erbil (2014-11-23; 2014-12-14; 2015-01-18; 2015-
01-25) 
 
Meeting2 Field Visit to Baharka IDP Camp  
 Erbil (2014-11-30) 
 
Meeting3 Education Cluster Meeting  
 Ministry of Education, Erbil (2014-12-01) 
 
Meeting4 Field Visit to Shaykhan IDP Camp, organized by MSB  
 Duhok (2014-12-02) 
 
Meeting5 WASH Sector/Cluster Consultations, organized by UNICEF 
 Saad Palace, Erbil (2014-12-16) 
 
Meeting6 Camp Coordination Meeting, Baharka IDP Camp 
 Erbil (2015-01-15) 
 
Meeting7 WASH Sector/Cluster Gap Workshop, organized by UNICEF 
 Directorate of Surrounding Water, Erbil (2015-01-19) 
 
 
 
 
  48 
Appendix G: Interview Guide 
Below are the main common questions asked in the interviews. 
 
 
- In what way is your organization [department, agency, etc.] involved in 
the IDP response? 
 
- Are you/your organization involved in the clusters? 
o If not, why? 
o If yes, do you find it a useful coordination forum? 
§ What is discussed there? 
§ Who and how many participate during cluster meetings? 
§ Are roles and responsibilities clearly divided? 
§ Are gaps and overlappings identified and mitigated? 
§ Monitoring and follow-up? 
§ Is there a workplan or operational strategy that guides 
cluster work? 
 
- How do you see IDP response coordination between: 
o The KRG and the GoI? 
o The KRG and the governorates? 
o The KRG and HCT/UN? 
o Various UN agencies? 
o Clusters? (Inter-cluster coordination?) 
o The UN and the NGOs? 
 
- Do you feel that you [or the cluster, the KRG, or the UN] have a 
comprehensive picture of the IDP situation? (Number of IDPs, locations, 
needs, etc.?) 
o Information sharing? 
o Analysis? 
 
- Is there a comprehensive plan or strategy to respond to this emergency, in 
your view? 
o SRP/IRPs – do these response plans guide your work/projects? 
 
- How do you view OCHA’s coordinating role in this emergency response? 
 
- Who would you say has taken the leading role in the IDP response in the 
KR-I? (the GoI, the KRG, or the UN?) 
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- Do you think that the relationship between the KRG and the humanitarian 
community has changed due to the emergency? 
 
- How do you find the IDP response in general? 
o Successful? 
o Efficient? Are resources well spent? Do actors coordinate? 
o What could have been done differently? Lessons learned? 
o Looking ahead, what are the challenges concerning the IDP 
response and its coordination?  
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Appendix H: Looking Ahead - Streams 
of Light? 
This study has touched upon a complex topic that changes daily. Although the 
outlook for responding to the needs of the IDPs in the KR-I—and especially in a 
coordinated way—is not bright, some developments since the beginning of 2015 
give reason for hope.  
 
 
Stabilized staffing and stronger leadership 
The extreme turnover in staff has stabilized and new, stronger, leadership within 
the UN has been installed. For example, the HC and the head of OCHA are new. 
 
Harmonization of IDP and refugee responses 
Harmonization of the IDP and refugee responses is taking shape. For example, 
sector/cluster meetings are held jointly and a common information-sharing tool is 
being used. Harmonization aims to reduce the number of meetings and increase 
use of the vulnerability-based approach, which addresses those with the greatest 
need first, regardless of other factors.75 
  
KRG Joint Crisis Center 
Since January, the KRG has initiated a Joint Crisis Center (JCC) on the ministerial 
level, under the MoI, (with the support of the Swedish MSB) responsible for all 
crisis coordination within the KRG.76 The JCC has direct linkages with involved 
ministries as well as with the three governorate emergency cells. Furthermore, two 
seconded UN staff are working at the center and contacts are established with the 
HCT.  
The JCC has the potential to fill the leadership vacuum concerning IDP 
response coordination at the ministerial level, and to be a clear KRG counterpart 
to the UN. Thus it has the potential to tighten the coordination network, as long as 
it receives long-term funding. (MFA 2014;NGO1;KRG10) The JCC 
establishment is another clear indication that the KRG takes the initiative in 
leading and coordinating the IDP response. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
75 Harmonization can never be total, because, for example, IDPs and refugees have different legal statuses and 
aid budgets and responsible agencies for the two groups differ. 
76 The JCC will be responsible for the coordination of all kinds of civilian crises, thus not only the IDP one, 
although that is currently the most pressing one. (NGO1) 
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Budget release 
KRG–GoI relations change daily, and even though an agreement for the GoI to 
release 2015 budgeted funds to the KRG had been reached in January—the KRG 
has still not received them (March 2015). Release of the budget and resumption of 
the PDS will have a significant, positive impact on the response, increasing the 
financial capacity of the KRG and of the host community. Thus, political solu-
tions are vital to affect a long-term solution of this response.  
 
The role of the host community 
It is important to mention that, although not included in the scope of this study, 
the Iraqi host community has been the main supplier of assistance to IDPs in all 
areas of the country (including the KR-I). One report77 shows that up to 75% of 
support to the IDPs has been provided by the host community and not by the UN 
or the government. Whether this should be seen as a failure of formal institutions, 
or a strength of the host community and informal structures, is another question. 
But this does put the issue in perspective. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
77 Not verified by the author; information received during an NGO interview. 
